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Abstract
In an Internet auction, bidders sequentially decide whether or not
to enter, and each bidder has to pay a participation cost. In this paper
we model an Internet auction with a temporary buyout option. Our
main result shows that under certain condition, offering a temporary
buyout price would encourage entry of risk neutral bidders, and hence
enable the seller to increase expected payoff.
Keywords: Internet auction, temporary buyout option
JEL classification: D44
∗Corresponding author: Discipline of Economics, Merewether Building H04, Faculty
of Economics and Business, The University of Sydney, NSW, Australia, 2006. Tel: +61-
2-9351 5625. Fax: +61-2-9351 4341. E-mail address: x.che@econ.usyd.edu.au
1
1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by Internet auctions1, in which buyout options
are present. This option allows a bidder to stop auction and immediately
obtain the object by exercising a pre-determined price. Mainly, there are
two types of “buyout option”: the first is a permanent buyout option, which
remains available throughout the whole auctioning competition and was
offered on Yahoo. The second is a temporary buyout option and active as
long as no bid has been put in the auction, which is offered on eBay, called
“Buy-It-Now”. This temporary option will be disappeared after first bid is
placed and then the object keeps being auctioned. In this paper, we only
focus on temporary buyout option.
From eBay’s quarterly reports for 2007-2008, it shows that fixed price
trading, mainly consisting of “Buy-It-Now” purchases, accounts for more
than 40% of gross merchandise volume. Moreover, accross different product
categories, percentage of augmenting Internet auctions with a buyout option
would be between 20% and 60%. Our main interest is to investigate in which
case it is attractive for the seller to combine an auction with a temporary
buyout option.
As the leading innovation of Internet commerce, Internet auctions have
some common characteristics. First, not like in simultaneous-bidding frame-
work, usually an Internet auction lasts online a few days in order to attract
bidders as many as possible. During this auctioning period, each bidder will
sequentially arrive in the auction house and endogenously decide whether to
put a bid in the auction or not. Second, bidders cannot “physically” meet
seller in an Internet auction. Therefore, before entry, each bidder has to
spend some effort, money and time identifying seller’s reliability and level
of service, and also the opportunity cost of time associated with bidding,
all which can be seen as an participation cost for each bidder2. Bajari and
Hortacsu (2003) have shown significantly empirical evidence of entry cost
from eBay auctions, and also suggested that this cost would be one of the
main determinant factors of entry.
In this paper, we construct a simple two-valuation model with two bid-
ders to illustrate how a temporary buyout price might be profitable for a
seller. First, we characterize bidders’ participation strategies when partic-
1Mainly, Internet auctioning mechanism is constrained to use sealed-bid second price
auction.
2Even thought eBay has a feedback system to assess sellers’ reputation, eBay still
suggests potential bidders to contact with the seller and check his creditability before
bidding, since this reputation system might be easily manipulated by sellers.
2
ipation is costly and bidders sequentially decide whether or not to enter
the auction. Furthermore, given two bidders’ entry strategies, we analyze
optimal reserve price and payoff for the seller. Then, in the same scenario,
we allow the seller to offer a temporary buyout option. The participation
cost C still needs to be paid whether the object is acquired through bidding
or exercising the buyout option. We show that under certain condition, the
buyout option would attract risk neutral bidders into the auction, which
consequently increases the seller’s expected payoff.
So far, the explanation of buyout option is mainly based on risk aver-
sion of either sellers or bidders. Budish and Takeyama (2001); Mathews
and Katzman (2006); Hidve´gi, Wang, and Whinston (2006); Reynolds and
Wooders (2009) argue that by augmenting a temporary or permanent buy-
out option a (risk averse) seller can extract more profit from risk averse
bidders. In the literature, some theoretical analysis on participation cost in
an auction have been discussed by Tan and Yilankaya (2006); McAfee and
McMillan (1987); Levin and Smith (1994); Samuelson (1985). Furthermore,
Bulow and Klemperer (2009) discuss jump bidding in the case of costly
participation and sequential entry in the auction.
2 The model
Consider a seller S selling an object by employing an Internet auction.
The auction will be proceeded online for a few days, in which there is a
queue of risk neutral bidders sequentially arriving, but the total number of
entry of potential bidders is uncertain. In order to simplify the model, we
assume that there are only two risk neutral bidders (i : 1 and 2) competing
for the object, and the sequence of both bidders arriving in the auction is
exogenous given such that bidder 1 is the leading bidder and bidder 2 is the
following bidder. Furthermore, we also assume that after a bidder decides
not to put a bid, he leaves the auction and cannot revisit.
Before making a decision of participation, each bidder’s valuation Vi is
independently drawn from {VL, VH}, where 0 < VL < VH . Let α represent
the probability a bidder is of type VL. In order to submit a bid, each bidder
has to incur a participation cost C, i.e., money and time associated with
bidding, where C ∈ (0,∆), ∆ = VH − VL and VL − C > 0. This cost is
the same across both bidders3. The seller values zero to the object and can
3Obviously, if biding cost is zero in the auction, auctioning result should be the same
between sequential and simultaneous entry of bidders.
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choose a reserve price R on the interval [0, VH ] to maximize his profit4.
2.1 Bidders’ participation strategies
In this section we analyze bidders’ participation decisions. For each bid-
der, he will enter the auction iff his expected payoff is equal or greater than
the participation cost C. Obviously, there would exist many equilibria in the
model, but here we only restrict our attention to the “credible” equilibrium
in which each bidder bids his valuation conditional on entering the auction5.
Given reserve price R from seller, we characterize bidders’ entry strategies.
Given parameters in the auction, bidder 1’s entry strategy is mainly
depended on which reserve price R the seller sets. Thus, we characterize
bidder1’s entry strategy in terms of which valuation he has would enter the
auction. If α(VL−R) < C, only bidder 1 with VH would enter the auction. If
α(VL−R) ≥ C, bidder 1 with both values would participate in the auction.
Bidder 2 is the following bidder. When she arrives in the auction, she
observes leading bidder’s entry decision and has a information update, then
decides whether or not to incur the cost to participate in the auction.
After observing bidder 1 puts a bid in the auction, bidder 2, according
to reserve price and entry strategies bidder 1 would have, will have different
corresponding entry strategies. Therefore, conditional on bidder 1 in the
auction, we characterize bidder 2’s entry decision in following two cases: If
α(VL − R) < C, which implies that bidder 1’s valuation is VH , then bidder
2 always chooses not to enter. If α(VL −R) ≥ C, which implies that bidder
1’s valuation could be either VH or VL with corresponding probabilities of
α and (1 − α), then bidder 2 will enter if V2 = VH and α(VH − VL) ≥ C,
otherwise chooses not to enter.
When bidder 1 is not in the auction, bidder 2 will enter and obtain the
object by paying R iff V2 ≥ R+ C.
Compared to bidder 2’s entry strategy, bidder 1 has relatively advantage
of entry, which shows that after entering the auction, bidder 1’s bid can
4We see that the maximum reserve price R the seller can charge is VH − C. If R >
VH − C, then no bidder can enter at all.
5We would see other equilibria in the model. For example, there is an equilibrium in
which bidder 1 always bids VH if his valuation is greater than (R+C), otherwise chooses
not to participate. Bidder 2 enters iff bidder 1 is not in the auction and V2 ≥ (R+C). In
this equilibrium, only one bidder enters the auction and wins the object by paying reserve
price. If (R + C) ≤ VL, there also can be another equilibrium in which bidder 2 always
bids VH , and bidder 1 never enters the auction. In this equilibrium, bidder 2 obtains the
object by paying reserve price. A large literature has been discussed about selection of
“reasonable” equilibria in a sequential game. Riley (2001) gives a survey in this literature.
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(partially) deter the entry of bidder 2 and increase the possibility of winning
the object.
Proposition 1. Given that bidder 1 is in the Internet auction, bidder 2
enters the auction iff V2 = VH , α(VL −R) ≥ C and α(VH − VL) ≥ C.
2.2 Optimal reserve price and seller’s payoff
From the previous discussion, bidders’ entry strategies are also depended
on which reserve price the seller proposes. Now we discuss optimal reserve
price, denoted as R∗. The seller maximizes his expected payoff by choosing
R∗.
No matter in which case, type-VL bidder 2 always cannot participate in
the auction. Thus, when the seller sets optimal reserve price R∗, the key
point will be to distinguish whether or not type-VH bidder 2 would have
possibility to enter the auction conditional on bidder 1 putting a bid, which
only depends on whether α(VH − VL) is greater or less than C. Therefore,
given these two bidders’ strategies, we separate the analysis in two cases:
α(VH − VL) ≥ C and α(VH − VL) < C. Moreover, in each case, whether or
not type-VL bidder 1 can enter the auction, depending on the reserve price,
yields different expected payoffs to the seller. Thus, in either of both cases,
we separately investigate R∗ and payoff for the seller in terms of whether
α(VL −R) is greater or less than C.
Firstly, we consider the case α(VH − VL) ≥ C, the seller will choose
R∗ to maximize his profit. If α(VL − R) ≥ C, the maximum reserve price
the seller can charge is VL − 1αC and then bidder 1 with both valuations
and bidder 2 with VH would enter the auction, which yields expected payoff
(1−α)2VH +α(2−α)VL−C. If α(VL−R) < C, the maximum reserve price
the seller can charge is VH − C and only one bidder with VH will enter the
auction. This gives expected payoff (1−α2)(VH−C) to the seller. Therefore,
in this case, the seller will choose R∗ between VL− 1αC and VH−C, depending
on which expected payoff is greater.
For another case α(VH − VL) < C, we still keep using the same logic
to analyze R∗. If α(VL − R) ≥ C, the maximum reserve price is VL − C
and then bidder 1 with both valuations enters and bidder 2 cannot enter at
all, which yields payoff (VL − C). If α(VL − R) < C, the maximum reserve
price is VH − C and only one bidder with VH will enter the auction, which
yields payoff (1− α2)(VH −C). Thus, in this case, the seller will choose R∗
between VL − C and VH − C by simply comparing two expected payoffs.
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Proposition 2. Optimal reserve price R∗ and expected payoff for the seller:
Given If the condition holds R∗ equals Payoff
α
2
(2VH − VL − C) < VH − VL VH − C (1− α2)(VH − C)
α(VH − VL) ≥ C α
2
(2VH − VL − C) ≥ VH − VL VL − 1αC (1− α)2VH + α(2− α)VL − C
α2(VH − C) < VH − VL VH − C (1− α2)(VH − C)
α(VH − VL) < C α2(VH − C) ≥ VH − VL VL − C (VL − C)
2.3 Temporary buyout option
In this section we consider the same scenario but the seller can offer a
temporary buyout option, denoted as B. The auction will stop immediately
when B is exercised. When a bid is put in the auction, the buyout option
will be disappeared and following bidder only can choose whether to enter
or leave. The participation cost C needs to be paid for either exercising
B or putting a bid. From proposition 2, there are four cases for the seller
to maximize his profit. Therefore, we separately discuss in which case the
seller offers a buyout option would be profitable and how to set up a buyout
price.
When the conditions for R∗ = VH−C hold, only a type-VH bidder enters
in the auction. In this case, if the seller wants to offer a buyout option, the
maximum buyout price can be R∗ and there is no difference for the type-VH
bidder to put a bid or exercise the option. Thus, the buyout option yields
the same expected payoff as auction without buyout option.
If the conditions for R∗ = VL − 1αC hold, bidder 1 with both values
participates in the auction, and bidder 2 will enter if V2 = VH . In this case,
the auction attracts bidders as many as it can. Thus, it is unnecessary to
set up a buyout option, or the seller can choose a buyout price high enough
such that no bidder exercises.
In the last case, given the conditions for R∗ = VL − C, only bidder 1
will be in the auction and bidder 2 cannot enter. However, in this case,
offering a temporary buyout option would improve the signal of bidder 1’s
entry to bidder 2, and hence increase the seller’s expected payoff. First, we
know that bidder 2 holds a belief {α, 1− α} regarding bidder 1’s valuations.
Then, given bidder 2’s belief, let the seller set a buyout price B and a reserve
price R′ such that VH −B = α(VH −R′) and α(VL −R′)− C = 0. Solving
the equations we have B = (1−α)VH +αVL−C and R′ = VL− 1αC. We see
that only type-VH bidder 1 can exercise the buyout option B. If the buyout
option is not exercised, it implies that bidder 1’s valuation should be VL
and then this information encourages type-VH bidder 2 to enter the auction.
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Also, given this possibility of more entry from bidder 2, type-VH bidder
1 has to exercise the buyout option and obtains the object immediately6.
In this case, offering a buyout option in the auction yields expected payoff
(1 − α)2VH + α(2 − α)VL − C to the seller, which is strictly greater than
(VL − C).
Proposition 3. A temporary buyout option would encourage entry of bid-
ders, which consequently increases the seller’s expected payoff, if the follow-
ing condition holds:
(VH − VL) < min
{
α2(VH − C), 1
α
C
}
(1)
Remark 1. A temporary buyout option encouraging entry of bidders would
still hold if we assume more general circumstances.
Example: Suppose that three-type valuations are {5, 6, 7} with prob-
abilities of
{
3
8 ,
3
8 ,
2
8
}
. Let the participation cost C equal 12 . Two bidders
still decide in turn whether or not enter the auction. Without a temporary
buyout option, it is easy to check that the optimal reserve price R∗ should
be 163 , and the seller’s expected payoff equals
19
4 . Moreover, when bidder 1
is in the auction, bidder 2 will enter iff V2 = 7.
Now we introduce a temporary buyout option in the auction such that
7−B = 38(7−R′) + 38(7− 6) and 38(5−R′) = 12 . Solving the equations we
have R′ = 113 and B =
43
8 . In this case only type-7 bidder 1 will exercise the
buyout option. In bidder 2’s turn, if the buyout price is not exercised, he
knows that bidder 1’s valuation should be less than 7, which encourages the
entry of bidder 2 (who with both valuations 6 and 7 will enter the auction).
Finally, we have that the seller’s expected payoff equals 31764 , which is greater
than 194 , and it is profitable to offer a temporary buyout price in the auction.
3 Conclusion
Our main result shows that under certain condition, offering a temporary
buyout option would increase the possibility of entry of bidders in an Internet
auction, which increases the seller’s expected payoff.
6If type-VH bidder 1 bids his valuation but does not exercise B, type-VH bidder 2
believes that he faces type-VL bidder 1 and still participates in the auction, which reduces
bidder 1’s payoff.
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